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N 1974, Congress passed a major piece of private sector pension reform legislation, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). ERISA was designed to increase the probability that private sector employees receive pensions. It included provisions requiring liberalized vesting rules, more stringent funding requirements, *Tlic author is a professor of economics and industrialand labor iclationsatCornell University, Research support was provided by the National Science Foundation and much of die cLitatiscdin (lie paper was provided by the International City Management Association. Seminars based upon earlier versions ol thispaper were presented at several workshops. The author is grateful to Alan Marcus and David Rogers for their research assistance and to Edward Laiear and Robert S, Smith for their comments. and increased fiduciary responsibility. The need for, and wisdom of, ERISA-type controls over public employees' retirement systems is currently under debate. 1 Unfortunately, as with many other government regulations, public sector pension reform legislation would likely have unintended side effects.
2 Btcause ERISA-type 'The recent publication of U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Education and Labor, Pension Task Force Report on Public Employee Retirement Systems (Washington, D.C.: G.P. O., 1978) , which contains a survey of state and local government retirement system characteristics, has added further fuel to the debate.
That ERISA itself had many "unintended" side effects is now widely recognized and studies of the act's quantitative impact onavaiiety of areas are cur- controls inaease costs of providing pensions, one would expect governments to shift at least part of the increased costs to their employees in the form of lower wages, To the extent that the costs are not fully shifted, one would also expect lower levels of public employment and increased costs of public services(in the form of higher taxes).' Hence, it is not obvious a priori that such legislation is socially desirable. As a prelude to a more complete evaluation of the desirability of public sector pension reform legislation, this paper seeks toascertain if a tradeoff exists between retirement system characteristics and wages in the public sector,*
Industrial and Labor Relations
The Trade-Off in the Public Sector
Pension plans take many forms, but most can be categorized as either "defined-contribution plans" or"defined-benefilplans," In defined-contribution plans, the amount of money contributed to an employee's account at each point in time is determined by such criteria as the employee's wage or the firm's profits. These contributions are invested by the firm or its agent, and the employee receives noguarantee about the benefit levels that will be received upon retirement. Far more prevalent in the public sector than defined-contribution plans, however, are defined-benefil plans. 5 In such 'Robert Tilove, Public Employee Pension Funds (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976). Why defined benefit plans predominate is an issue that is plans, the worker is guaranteed a pension of a given amount per year upon retirement. The benefit level is often a function of one or more factors, such as an employee's years of service and the wage over his or her tenure with the government.
Dcfincd-bencfit pension plans are typically quite complex and contain numerous provisions, These include minimum age and/or service requirements for receipt of benefits upon retirement; vesting rules; rules that specify which salary level enters into the calculation of a retiree's benefits (final year's, average of final n years, career average, with or without overtime earnings, and so forth); required employee contribution rates to the retirement system; and a variety of rules that relate to special situations (such as early retirement provisions., disability benefit provisions, provisions for death benefits for death prior to retiremenl, and survivors' options). 6 Fortunately, in most cases it is straightforward to calculate how changing a provision will alter the net contributions that an employer must make each period to an employee's pension fund, account in order to keep the account fully funded.
7 For example, increasing employees' required contribution rale will decrease not addressed here. Undoubtedly, the phenomenon reflects both employees' risk aversion (preference for a certain nominal benefit letel) and government officials' ability to uutlerfund defined benefit plans. the employer's net pension costs, while increasing the generosity of the plan by increasing the level of retirement benefits that are received for each year of service will increase the employer's net pension costs, ceteris paribus. In general, the required employer net pension fund contribution per employee each period (C) will be a function of the employee's current wage rate (W) and of a vector (R) of retirement system characteristics, (I) C = C{W,R) Previous studies of public sector wage determination have shown that variations in wage scales of public employees across cities can be explained by a vector of variables, X, which represent the determinants of the demand for, and supply of, public employees in a city, the extent of power of public employee unions, the extent of the local government's monopsony power, and the structure of the local government (as, for example, mayor-council or city manager), 8 Suppose that public employers arc indifferent as to how their total labor costs are divided between wages and retirement system contributions; this will occur if each dollar that public employers devote to wages has the same impact on labor turnover, turnover costs, and employee productivity as each dollar that they devote to retirement system contributions.' Under such condi- 
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Here W represents the wage scale function for public employees in cities without public employee retirement systems and W the function in cities with retirement systems, It immediately follows that for any retirement system provision fi,-,
Since increases in public employee wage scales never reduce public employers' net pension fund liabilities per employee ( JC/ 31C 2 1), changing any retirement system provision in a manner that increases employers' net pension fund liabilities per employee will lead to a reduction in public employees' wage scales. That is, other things equal, public employers with more generous pension plans will pay lower wages than public employers with less generous, or no, pension plans. Holding the characteristics of cities (X) constant, market observations on public sector wages and retirement system characteristics would trace out the trade-off curve for municipal employers.
Clearly, this is a simplification. As Sherwin Rosen lias superbly demonstrated, the observable market trade-off is a reduced form determined by the interaction of both employers' and employees' preferences. To identify the underlying structural model and estimate the implicit demand and supply "prices" of pension coverage would require a more detailed model (hat would include the roles of risk, tax treatment of pensions, differential rates of return on duced, one may argue that Equation 2 below should be replaced by a weaker expression that involves present values. As a result, the empirical work reported in Table l also includes present value equations.
governmental and individual investments, economies of scale in group provision of annuities, and the differential impact of pensions on turnover and turnover on productivity across cities.
10 Sadly, the available data do not permit me to identify the underlying structural equations that would be generated from such a model. As such, although I "maintain" the fiction that I am estimating the parameters of the employer trade-off curve to derive testable implications, it should be understood that I am actually estimating reduced-form market equilibrium equations below.
Empirical Analysis: 1973 Survey Data Based upon the analytic framework presented in the previous section, I specify estimating equations of the form (4) »ty = ai + aiX/+a,rt,-+u/ Here Wij represents the logarithm of the wage scale (entrance or maximum) of public employees in category i (police or firefighters) in city ;', X, is a vector of variables expected to influence the wages of public employees in city ;', Rj is a vector of characteristics of the public employees' retirement system in city ;, otj and a 8 are vectors of coefficients, «o is the intercept term, and u/isa random error term. cipal Police and Fire Departments."
The X, are drawn from those variables that have been shown to influence public sector wages in previous studies of public sector wage determination," These include a measure of union power, the form of municipal government, and a set of sociodemographic and economic variables that represent the determinants of the fiscal capacity of a municipality, the relative preferences of a community for various public services, and alternative wages in the private sector, As with previous studies, the X, do not include any measures of the "quality" of municipal employees in a city; these data are unfortunately not available. To the extent that municipalities that offer high wages and generous retirement benefits can attract better applicants, and consequently higher quality employees, the omission of any "quality" variables may bias the estimates of the coefficients of the retirement system characteristics away from finding evidence of any compensating differentials.
The available retirement system characteristics in this first data set include whether police and firefighters belong to the same retirement system, whether the uniformed employees' retirement system is distinct from the system for other municipal employees, whether a compulsory retirement age exists, the minimum age an employee must attain to be eligible for regular retirement benefits, the percentage of salary that retirees receive for minimum regular retirement benefits, and the employees' retirement contributions as a fraction of their annual salary. While the first three retirement system characteristics are included primarily as controls, the latter three directly affect employers' net pension costs. It is straightforward lo show that, ceteris paribus, an increase in the retirement age or the employees' contribution rate reduces employers' net pension costs and an increase in the plan's generosity increases it, 
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and maximum (W t ) salaries, the logarithms of firefighters' entrance (IV,) and maximum (W-i) salaries per 40 hour workweek, and the logarithms of an estimate of the present value of police patrolmen and firefighters' annual earnings as dependent variables are presented in Table 1 . Definitions and sources of all the variables are given in this table, which uses data from all cities over 50,000 that reported information on wages and retirement system characteristics. Table  2 presents the coefficients of the retirement system characteristics obtained from similar regressions restricted to a subset of cities in which the uniformed employees' retirement systems are distinct from the systems for other municipal employees.
The coefficients of the X, variables found in Table 1 are of interest in tlieir own right and warrant brief discussion. A formal parity agreement (X,) decreases the police annual wage, but leads to an increase in the firefighter annual wage (standardized for hours of work), Firefighters' hourly wages are higher in cities with union contracts primarily because ol the reduction in hours of work the unions have achieved (compare the coefficients of X s in columns 4 and 5 in Table 1 with those in columns 6 and 7). While annual wages are higher in cities in which a city manager is the chief operating officer (X,), the differential vanishes for firefighters once we control for hours of work. These results are all consistent with previous studies of public sector wage determination, as are the coefficients of the other socioeconomic and demographic variables included in the analysis.
In the main, when significant the signs of the retirement system coefficients are as predicted. Increasing the fraction of their salaries that police and firefighters contribute to their retirement nystems {Ri) reduces municipal einployets' net pension costs, ceteris paribus, and does lead to an increase in tlieir employees' wages. The results in Table 1 appear to indicate thai firefighters are more successful than police in obtaining higher wages to compensate them for higher employee retirement contributions; however, once I restrict the sample to uniformed employee-specific systems (Table 2) , iheir differential success vanishes, Indeed, one can not reject the hypothesis that police and firefighters are fully compensated for increased contributions (every one percentage point increase in their contribution rate leading to an increase in salaries of one percent) from these data.
As expected, increases in the percentage of salary police receive for minimum regular retirement (fl 5 ) do significantly reduce wages, but the relationship is insignificant for firefighters. In cities with a compulsory retirement age, firefighters' wages are higher. While not explicitly included in my model, this latter result is consistent with the view that employers gain from such work rules and hence are willing to pay for them.
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In contrast, the coefficient ol the minimum regular retirement age variable (K3) is negative whenever it is statistically significant. At first glance, this result appears to be inconsistent with my model. Later retirement ages reduce employers' net retirement system contributions, ceteris paribus, which should lead to compensatingly higher wages and a positive coefficient for this variable.
"An alternative rationale tor the relationship between mandatory retirement provisions and wages is found in Laiear, "Why fs There Mandatory Retirement?" Lazear's model implies that wage growth should be positively associated with the existence of mandatory retirement provisions, Since the estimated percentage effects of mandatory retirement provisions on firefighters' maximum salaries is greater than that on minimum salaries (see Tables I and 2) , some support for his view is found here.
I should stress, however, that the implication that public employees' retirement age and wage scales will be positively correlated was derived from a model in which retirement systems were assumed to be fully funded and employers expected with certainty to make promised pension payments. In the next section, which considers the impact of underlunding on the wage-pension trade-off in more detail, I argue that if underlunding is meant to be "permanent" and is negatively correlated with the probability that promised retirement benefits will be fully paid rather than simply reflecting an intertemporal translerof pension costs, then employers with more fully funded systems would pay lower wages, ceteris paribus, Elsewhere I have shown that holding other things constant, including employers' net contributions to the retirement fund, a higher retirement age will lead to a more fully funded retirement system. negative relationship is generated between wages and retirement ages that may well offset the positive relationship predicted by the previous model. Thus, the negative relationship between retirement age and public sector wages observed in this section is not necessarily inconsistent with the existence of a trade-off between retirement system characteristics and wages.
15 Additional empirical evidence to support the "funding" hypothesis is presented below.
The Impact of Underfunding on the Wage-Pension Trade-Off The empirical results just presented are based upon a model in which public employees expect to receive their promised pension benefits with certainty and in which public employers make sufficient contributions to retirement systems to keep the systems fully funded. Many public sector retirement systems are far from fully funded, however; the House Pension Task Force recently estimated that 75 percent of public employers were not funding at the levels required by ERISA and that the average funding deficiency was about $16,000 per worker. 16 State constitutional guarantees of public employees' pension benefits notwithstanding, public employees may perceive that underfunding reduces the probability that they will receive some, or all, of their promised future retirement benefits.
17 Consequently, they may demand "The negative relationship may also arise because of simultaneous equations bias, since many of ihc (actors lhat influence wages may also influence retirement system parameters. A strong union, for example, could achieve both a high wage scale and a low minimum retirement age, resulting in a spurious negative correlation between the two variables. Unfortunately. the available data are not rich enough to provide a set of variables that can be used to identify a structural system in which wage and retirement system characteristics are simultaneously determined. This problem is discussed in more detail below, "U higher current wages as the extent of underfunding increases. Moreover, to the extent that public employers perceive their underfunding to be "permanent." and not merely a way of shifting retirement system costs on to future generations of taxpayers, their net retirement system contributions will decrease and they should be "willing" to pay higher wages. 18 Thus, the extent of underfunding should be allowed to influence the magnitude of the public sector wage-pension benefits trade-off. 'This view of underfunding should be contrasted with that of Mumy, "The Economics of. . .," who treats underfunding as an intertemporal cost transfer, not as reflecting the probability ot nonpayment of benefits.
"The argument in the text warrants elaboration: the actual ellect of underfunding on wages depends upon boih employers' and employees' perceptions, making a number of situations possible. First, employers may view underfunding as simply an intertemporal cost transfer, II this is the case, they would not be willing to offer higher wages in the event of underfunding and no wage-undertunding tradeoff would be observed.
Second, employers may regard underfunding as cost saving, at least to the currently elected administration. This might occur if they arc unconcerned about future financial crises that may result (due to underfunding) after they leave office or if they believe higher levels of government would "bail-out" their retirement system if retirees ever faced possible nonreceipt of benefits. If underfunding reduces public employers' perceived costs ol pensions, this will increase their willingness to pay higher wages; whether a wage-underfunding trade-oft actually exists, however, depends on employees' perceptions.
It employees arc unaware of underfunding or be-Unfortunately, accurate estimates of (he extent of underfunding of individual public sector retirement systems are scanty. However, even when funding data are not directly observable there is a way to "control" for the extent of underfunding in analyses of the trade-off. Elsewhere, I have presented a scries of models of public sector retirement systems and for each derived the observable determinants, or correlates, of the extent of retirement system funding.
20 Ceteris paribus, the extent of retirement system funding is seen in these models to vary directly with the ratio of retirement system assets to current benefit payments, the ratio of the number of local government employees to the nimil)cr of retirees receiving benefits, the ratio of the fraction of wages paid into the system by the employer and employees to the fraction of final wages received as retirement benefits by retirees, with the real rate of return on retirement system assets, and with the retirement age. Hence, as each of these variables increases one would expect to observe public employees'wages decreasing if, in fact, the extent of funding is related to the probability ol receipt of promised retirement benefits.
The negative relationship between the reiiicmcnt age and wages observed in the previous section may well reflect the correlation of the former with theextentof underfunding. More confidence could be placed, Neve it will have MO effen on their expected retirement benefits, they will ignore under funding in their choice of employers and, ceteris paribus, be attracted to high-wage employers. Since employers who underfluid could (in the alwve case) afford to pay higher wages, one would expect 10 observe large-scale underfunding predominating, as employers sought to pay high wages to attract municipal employees. In other words, one rmght observe near lotal under fund itig by .ill public employers and no wage-underfunding tradeoff.
If employees are awaie of underfunding, however, and if they perceive it to reduce their expected benefits, iliey would demand higher wages to compensate them for the risks associated with underfunding. Employers with unfunded retirement systems would have to olfer higher wages to attract employees; thus, as unfunded liabilities increased so would wages. Only in this situation, the one I focus on in the text, would one observe boih a |wsitive wage-under funding tradeoff and the coexistence of retirement systems in which funding practices vary widely. Table 3 . Perhaps due to the relatively small sample sizes, the coefficients tend to be statistically insignificantly different from zero.* 1 When significant, however, they have the correct sign. An increase in the estimated rate of return on assets (F 2 ) does tend to reduce wages, while an increase in the ratio of retired system members to active system members (F s ) does lend to increase wages, n Similarly, an increase in annual benefits paid to each retired member in relation to the system's annual receipts per active member (T^) does tend to increase firefighters' wages as predicted. Each of these results is consistent with what we would expect if these variables were correlates of the extent of system underfunding.
While the results of this section are not totally unambiguous, they do support the view that these correlates are useful proxies for the extent of retirement system underfunding. Furthermore, the extent of underfunding doesappear to be related to employers' {and employees') perceptions of the probability that promised retirement benefits will not be fully paid, and these perceptions are reflected in compensating wage differentials. " Also includoi in rlicjiiialysiswcrciliosccxogcnoiisvai-utblcitfuniKl in ' L alilc I, as wcIF asilicltuionicMiii vurialtk-s [»i the nonrcjroriing of each of l lie In ruling proxies. {'Definitions of i" variables: f I = projjoition of llie retirement system's members covered by the social security system in 1977 Fi = retirement system's realized earnings on investments divided by the retirement system's assets in 1971 Fj = retirement system's retired members divided by its active members in 1971 F t -retirement system's assets divided by retirement system's animal benefit payments in 1971 t\ •= retirement system's Iwnefii |mynw ins \xr retired memberdivided by ttsrcccipispci active member in 1971 c Coefficient multiplied hy 100.
•Significant at the .05 level with a two-tailed test.
• presented some more direct evidence on the trade-off between the extent ol under funding and municipal employees' wage rates in Pennsylvania. Sec Robert S. Smith, "Pensions, Underfutiding, and Wages in the Public Sector" mimeo (Cornell Univcisiiy, March 1979).
Empirical Analysis: 1974 -75 Survey Data
The data analyzed in the previous two sections, although supportive of llie view that a trade-off exists between public sector wages and retirement system characteristics, contain information on only a limited setof retirement system characteristics, none of which would likely be affected by public sector pension reform legislation. Moreover, the data are restricted to police and firefighters. No information for other functional categories of employees isp esented.
To remedy these shortcomings, I now present analyses of data from the International City Management Association's 1974-75 Survey of U.S. Municipality Employee Benefits {see U.S. Conference of Mayors, Third National Survey . . ., for a description). These data have the advantages of containing a large number of observations, covering sanitation employees as well as police and firefighters, and containing information on a much richer set of retirement system characteristics, Their disadvantages are that they do not contain data on either unionization or employees' contributions to the retirement system and that they contain data on average annual earnings, rather than minimum and maximum wage scales. Average earnings may differ across cities because of differences in the seniority structures of the cities' work forces, and the omission of important explanatory variables, such as unionization and employee contributions, may bias the remaining coefficients. Nevertheless, because of the richer set of retirement system characteristics available, these data are a useful supplement lo those analyzed in the previous section. Table <1 presents estimates of variants of Equation 4 that utilize these data for a sample of cities over 25,000 in population for which data on the vector of variables X were available. Also included in the table in brackets are the implied coefficients from a canonical correlation analysis; I will return to these latter coefficients shortly. Unambiguous implications about the signs of several of the retirement system coefficients can be drawn and these are the variables upon which the discussion will center.
Unlike with the earlier data, increases in the minimum regular retirement age (r,) are significantly positively related to wages for both police and firefighters here, as predicted. When overtime pay is included in average salary used lo calculate retirement benefits (r 9 ), it increases employers' net costs of providing pensions and should thus reduce wages. This in fact occurs for firefighters. Similarly, if the calculation of retirement benefits uses a higher percentage multiple for earnings above a fixed level (/,"), this should increase retirees' benefits and employers' costs, ceteris paribus, and reduce wages-which occurs forpolice. The existence of monthly deferred vested retirement benefits for individuals who leave service prior to retirement (r l5 ) also increases employers' costs of pensions and should, and does, lead to lower wages. All these results are consistent with the existence of a trade-off between wages and retirement system characteristics.
In contrast, many retirement system characteristics one would expect to influence wage levels prove consistently to be insignificant, For example, in a period of inflation, or if wages increase with age, the smaller the number of years' salary used in the calculation of W*, the higher retirement benefits and employers' costs will be and hence the lower wages should be. Relative to the omitted category (W* equal to ihc final year's wage), the coefficients of r, (W* equal to a 3-or 5-year average) and r t (W* equal to a 10-year or career average) should therefore be positive. While in the main they are, the coefficients are never significant. Similarly, postretiremen! cost-of-living adjustments in retirement benefits should increase employers' net pension costs and lead them to pay lower wages, Yet coefficients of that variable are all insignificant and as a result the variable does not even appear in Table 4 , Finally, the fraction of average pay reiirees receive for normal retirement (r n ) i~ never significant,"
The insignificant coefficients of these retirement system characteristics may be due to collinearity among the various characteristics. What is more disturbing is that increasing the number of years of service required for regular retirement (rj leads toa reduction in wages, and the existence of "The equations reported in Tabic i use fractions of pay alter 25 years of service, Substitution of the tractions after 15 or 35 years, or use ot all three fractions simultaneously Joes not alter this conclusion, ••Significant at (lie .10 level will) a two-tailed test. cither monthly survivors' benefits (»•") or lump-sum death benefits (r, s ) for nonservice-related deaths leads to an increase in wages. Each of these variables' effects is opposite in sign to my prior expectation, based upon knowledge of their effects on employers' net pension costs, It is of course possible thai these parameter estimates are subject to simultaneous equations bias; many of the exogenous factors thai influence wages may also influence the reiiremcnt system characteristics. In the absence of a data set that is sufficiently rich to provide a set of variables thai can be used to identify a structural system in which wages and retiremenl system characieristics arc simultaneously determined, I adopt a second-best approach to try to control for this problem. Recall that we are estimating variants of Equation 4 and the slatistical problem is that the vector Rj may be correlated with the error term Uj. Now if Equation 4 holds, it must be true that
where the bars indicate the mean values of the variables in the sample, In this form, the vectors of parameters ot| and « 2 can be estimated using canonical correlation analysis, Since the wage and reiiremcnt system characteristic variables are now on the "same side" of the equation, simultaneous equations bias should be eliminated. Moreover, as ihe parameters from canonical correlation analyses are unique only up to a multiple, we can normalize the resulting coefficients, setting the RETIREMENT SYSTEMS / parameter of the deviation of the logarithm of earnings from iis sample mean (W,y -W) equal to one so as to make the other coefficients comparable to the regression coefficients found in Table 4 . Although there are no significance l<?sls for individual coefficients in canonical correlation analysis comparable to the Mesls of regression analysis, and the coefficients in this analysis cannot be given any structural interpretation, ihe magnitudes of the corresponding coefficients should suggest whether ihe estimates in Table 4 were subject to simultaneous equations bias.
The bracketed coefficients in Table 4 are ihe implied coefficients from ihe canonical correlation analyses that correspond to the regression coefficients. The coefficients have been normalized by setting the wage coefficient equal to one and the signs reported as if all variables other than the wage variable were on the right-hand side of ihe equation, In ihe main, when the retiremeni system variables were statistically significant and of the correct sign before (r" r 9 , r, 0 , and r"), ihe corresponding coefficient from the canonical correlation analyses is of approximately the same magnitude and of the same sign. In contrast, several of the retirement system characteristics coefficients that were statistically significant and of the wrong sign before now are smaller in absolute value (r<) or actually change sign (ri 5 ). These results suggest that the coefficients in Table 4 that had signs lhat 1 did not expect may well have been subject to simultaneous equations bias. However, until a richer data set that allows one lo build a more completemodel becomes available, no definitive conclusions can be reached on this point.
Concluding Remarks
The results presented in this paper support the proposition that, holding other variables constant, increases in uniformed employees' retirement system contributions lead to compensating increases in their salaries. They also support the hypothesis that, other things equal, more "generous" retirement system parameters are associated with salaries for police and firefighters that, if not completely compensating, are at D WAGE DIFFERENTIALS 483 least lower than would otherwise be expected. Finally, ihcy provide support for the view that ihe extent of retirement system underfunding is related to employers' and employees' perceptions of the probability that promised retirement benefits will not be fully paid, and that these perceptions are reflected in compensating wage differentials, The evidence on the latter two points, however, is not totally unambiguous. Unfortunately, the retirement system parameters most likely to be affected by a public sector variant of ERISA (vesting rules, funding requirements, and standards for fiduciary responsibility) were not rejjorted in the several daia sets used in this paper. Hence, one cannol directly translate my results inlo definitive quantitative statements about the effects of any proposed public sector pension reform legislation. Nevertheless, my results do support ihe proposition lhat a irade-otf exists between wages and retirement system characteristics in the public sector and suggest that such legislation will likely have an impact on future levels of public sector wages. To the extern lhat fully compensating wage differentials do not exist, such legislation will also have an impact on public sector employment levels and the taxes needed to finance state and local public services.
Clearly, additional studies should be undertaken in ihe future to improve the precision of my estimates of the trade-off, hopefully using data sets that permit one to establish parameters for retirement systems in a manner amenable to policy simulations. 2 * If better data seis become available, one could ideally include other nonwagc compensation items in the analysis and also estimate the wage-nonwage compensation trade-off in the context of a more complete structural model of the implicit market for nonwage compensation, as discussed in Shcrwin Rosen's "Hedonic Price..." paper, "Robert S. Smiih and 1 had ho|ied to analyze die claia thai undcrly U.S. House of Representatives, Pemion Task Force Report, which contain unpublished information on funding and vesting provisions. Unfortunately, ihe House Subcommittee which collected the data decided in May 1978 to keep it confidential and formally refused to grant us access to ii.
